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Book Review 
 
Five Myths About Sprawl 
Sprawl: A Compact History by Robert Bruegmann. Chicago, Ill.: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005. Pp. 301. $27.50 (cloth). 
Michael Lewyn∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, metropolitan America has been trans-
formed by “sprawl”: low-density, automobile-oriented, (usually) subur-
ban development.1 Many central cities have lost population,2 while their 
suburbs have gained residents3 and jobs.4 Moreover, cities’ remaining resi-
dents are disproportionately poor: the average income of suburban house-
holds is nearly twice that of urban households,5 and the majority of 
America’s poor now live in central cities.6 Typically, new suburban devel-
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 1. See Robert Bruegmann, Sprawl: A Compact History 18 (2005) (describing sprawl 
as “low-density, scattered, urban development”); Oliver Gillham: The Limitless 
City 4 (2002) (listing a variety of deªnitions, many of which emphasize development 
far from traditional regional cores as well as automobile-oriented nature of “sprawl” 
development). Bruegmann’s deªnition also describes sprawl as “unplanned.” See 
Bruegmann, supra at 18 (describing sprawl as development “without systematic 
large-scale or regional public land-use planning”). But if development is essentially 
sprawling in nature, it is sprawl regardless of whether or not it was “planned” by a 
regional government, a local government, or a real estate developer. Thus, whether the 
development is “planned” or “unplanned” is irrelevant to whether that development 
constitutes “sprawl.” 
 2. See David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs 7, 14–20 (3d ed. 2003) (reporting that, of 
America’s twelve largest cities in 1950, ten lost population in later decades; generally, 
cities have gained population only by annexing suburbs). But see infra notes 50–52 
and accompanying text (discussing recovery of some cities in 1990s). 
 3. See Mark Andrew Snider, Note, The Suburban Advantage: Are The Tax Beneªts of Home-
ownership Defensible?, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 157, 163 n.43 (2005) (noting that, since 1970, 
suburban population has grown by 40%). 
 4. See Roberta F. Mann, On The Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation Choice, 
24 Va. Tax Rev. 587, 607 (2005) (reporting that two-thirds of new jobs located in suburbs). 
 5. See Snider, supra note 3, at 163 (noting that average suburban household income in 
1999 exceeded $76,000, while average urban income only reached $40,816).  
 6. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 132 (“[A]lmost 55 percent of the nation’s citizens living 
in poverty dwelt in the inner city in 1998. In 1960, that number was less than one-third.”). 
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opment has been highly automobile-dependent: the majority of suburban 
jobs are not accessible through public transit.7 
A wide variety of commentators8 assert that sprawl has a number of 
social, political, and economic repercussions. In particular, critics of the 
status quo assert that sprawl immobilizes Americans too young, old, or 
poor to drive;9 increases trafªc congestion and pollution by increasing driv-
ing;10 makes Americans less healthy by discouraging walking;11 reduces 
the supply of farmland and open space by consuming more land than 
more compact development;12 and increases overall government spend-
ing, as governments spend money on roads and utilities for new suburbs 
while urban infrastructure becomes underutilized.13 
In Sprawl: A Compact History, Robert Bruegmann, an art historian, has 
painted a superªcially convincing case for the status quo, asserting that 
sprawl is “a natural result of afºuence that occurs in all urbanized socie-
ties.”14 Bruegmann’s book has generated glowing media publicity15 and 
some favorable scholarly attention.16 
 
                                                     
 7. See Mann, supra note 4, at 607. 
 8. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 74 (critics of sprawl include environmental groups, 
urban mayors, historic preservation groups, transit advocates, and some urban plan-
ners and architects). 
 9. See, e.g., Andres Duany et al., Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the 
Decline of the American Dream 116 (2001) (suggesting that the inability to walk 
to most activities means that “a [suburban] child’s personal mobility extends no far-
ther than the edge of [his or her] subdivision”); id. at 123 (stating that automobile de-
pendency puts non-driving elderly “out of reach of their physical and social needs”); 
see also Gillham, supra note 1, at 137 (describing hardships of carless urban poor in 
their efforts to reach suburban jobs). Cf. Jeff Plungis & Nick Bunkley, Innovations May 
Keep Seniors Safer on Road, Detroit News, Mar. 14, 2005, available at http://www. 
detnews.com/2005/specialreport/0503/14/A01-116287.htm (“21 percent of Ameri-
cans over 65 no longer drive. Within the non-driving population, 54 percent stay 
home on any given day because they don’t have a viable transportation option.”). 
 10. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 93 (suggesting that, as a result of sprawl, roads are 
“overwhelmed” and “the hours spent driving and stuck in trafªc arguably use in-
creasing amounts of energy and generate more air pollution.”). 
 11. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 76 (suggesting that “increase in driving and the de-
crease in walking are also contributing to obesity and ill health.”). 
 12. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 75, 77. 
 13. Id. at 124–46, 142 (raising argument, but noting that evidence unclear). 
 14. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save The Cities, Stop The Suburbs?, 116 yale l.j. 598, 603 (2006) 
(describing Bruegmann’s book). See also Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 10 (positing 
sprawl as a result of “the democratization of society . . . [as] citizens have obtained 
the ability to exercise the choices that once were the sole prerogative of the wealthy 
and powerful.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Vincent J. Cannato, The Way We Live Now, WKLY. Standard, Mar. 20, 2006, 
at 33, available at 2006 WLNR 4965810 (lauding book as “eminently readable and ra-
tional”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Learning to Love Sprawl, Saturday Evening Post, 
Mar. 1, 2006, at 90, available at 2006 WLNR 4261933 (stating book “makes a strong 
case that a lot of the things we think we know about sprawl just ain’t so. I hope that 
it gets the attention it deserves”); Kevin Nance, Learning to Sprawl: Think The Suburbs 
Are Getting Too Crowded?, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 27, 2005, at 39, available at 2005 WLNR 
20976009 (“[T]he early critical response to Bruegmann’s book has been mostly positive”).  
 16. See Garnett, supra note 14, at 609 (criticizing some of Bruegmann’s arguments, but 
describing book as “a valuable addition to the voluminous land use literature—well-
researched, well-written, thought-provoking, and full of captivating history”). 
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The purpose of this Review is to use Bruegmann’s defense of the status 
quo as a launching point for a broader discussion of the sprawl issue. In 
particular, this Review suggests that Bruegmann overestimates the uni-
versality of sprawl, by overlooking the differences between pedestrian-
friendly cities with some sprawling development and cities in which auto-
mobile-dependent sprawl is the only choice available to most consumers. 
In addition, Bruegmann understates the harmful social effects of sprawl, 
especially the effect of automobile-dependent development upon non-
drivers. Bruegmann also consistently underestimates the role of govern-
ment spending and regulations in creating sprawl and, as a result, fails to 
adequately discuss the possibility that sprawl can be reduced by limiting, 
rather than increasing, the size and intrusiveness of government. 
II. Five Pro-Sprawl Myths 
Bruegmann’s book claims that: 
1. Sprawl has been going on for centuries and is thus what most 
people naturally desire in the absence of government coercion;17 
2. Sprawl is thus the result of the free market at work, and any 
seemingly pro-sprawl government policies were virtually irrele-
vant to the growth of automobile-dependent suburbia;18 
3. Regardless of the origins of sprawl, the harmful side effects of 
sprawl are overrated by critics of the status quo;19 
4. Sprawl cannot be limited without government regulations that 
artiªcially constrict the housing supply and thus raise housing 
prices;20 and 
5. The anti-sprawl movement is elitist.21 
As will be shown below, each of these assertions is ºawed. In fact, the 
status quo is: (1) not inevitable; (2) partly a result of government interven-
tion in the economy; (3) has negative side effects ignored by Bruegmann; 
(4) can be changed without making government more intrusive; and (5) is 
opposed by Americans from a wide variety of backgrounds. 
A. Myth One: The Status Quo Is Eternal 
One of the most widely praised elements of Bruegmann’s book is his 
use of ancient history and comparative data to justify the status quo.22 
 
                                                     
 17. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 10 (claiming sprawl is perhaps a “predictable result 
of increasing wealth”); id. at 23–32 (describing pre-modern and nineteenth-century 
“sprawl”); id. at 73–80 (describing trend toward sprawl in afºuent countries). 
 18. See id. at 101–07. 
 19. See id. at 138–50. 
 20. See id. at 169–219. 
 21. See infra notes 179–185 and accompanying text (describing quotes scattered through-
out book). 
 22. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 14, at 600 (“Bruegmann’s most important contribution is 
to place the current debate . . . in historical perspective”); Cannato, supra note 15 
(“Bruegmann also places the issue within the larger historical context. He attempts to 
show that dispersal from high-density core areas to low-density outer areas is a phe-
nomenon common not just to modern America, but also ancient Rome and 19th-
century England”); Reynolds, supra note 15 (“Rich people have always wanted to 
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Bruegmann tells a story of eternal sprawl, pointing out that aristocrats 
have purchased country estates in civilizations as diverse as ancient Rome 
and eighteenth-century London.23 He goes on to show that, in both Europe 
and the United States, some central cities have declined while automobile 
use has risen in recent decades.24 Based on these facts, Bruegmann con-
cludes that sprawl is a “predictable result of increasing wealth”25 that has 
given the middle class “the ability to exercise the choices that once were 
the sole prerogative of the wealthy and powerful.”26 He thus suggests 
that, if sprawl is what the middle class wants, any attempt to limit sprawl 
or its effects is doomed.27 
There is a grain of truth underlying Bruegmann’s version of history: 
given the wide variety of consumer tastes, some people will always prefer 
relatively scattered, low-density housing. Bruegmann’s story, however, 
overlooks important differences of degree: every city may have some 
sprawling development, but not every city is equally dominated by sprawl. 
In the most “sprawl-bound” cities and metropolitan areas, most residents 
are unable to get to jobs or shops without driving. Carless residents are 
thus virtually helpless.28 For example, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma—a 
city with over 500,000 residents29—buses do not operate at night or on 
Sundays.30 Therefore, the 8.2% of households without cars31 are essentially 
frozen out of jobs that require evening work and are not within walking 
or bicycling distance. In cities planned around the automobile, streets are 
often so wide and trafªc moves so fast that the basic human act of walk-
ing outdoors becomes dangerous.32 Many streets lack sidewalks and, as a 
 
                                                     
sprawl”); Nance, supra note 15 (“Overall, Bruegmann contends, sprawl is a natural, 
historic, worldwide process of decentralization that’s been going on at least since an-
cient Rome and China, when the wealthy got away from the bustle and noise of city 
centers by building homes in outlying areas.”). 
 23. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 23–24.  
 24. Id. at 73–80. 
 25. Id. at 10. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 11 (stating that remedies to sprawl have consistently been “ineffective and in 
some cases have led to unintended consequences arguably worse than the initial 
problem.”). 
 28. See infra notes 134–140 and accompanying text (showing statistics on number of 
nondriving Americans; about one-third of all Americans, including 11.5% of adults, 
have no drivers’ license, while 21% of senior citizens, about half of disabled, and ma-
jority of welfare recipients do not drive). 
 29. The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2006 (Erik C. Gopel & Vincent Spadafora 
eds., 2006), at 480 (Oklahoma City had 528,042 residents in 2004). 
 30. See, e.g., General Information, Metro Transit, available at http://www.gometro. 
org (showing that, in Oklahoma City, buses do not run on Sundays or after 7:30 
p.m.); Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just An Environmental Issue, 84 Marq. 
L. Rev. 301, 348–50 (2000) (citing other examples of inadequate transit service 
throughout the United States). 
 31. Cf. Bikes at Work, The Carfree Census Database, available at http://www.bikesat 
work.com/carfree/carfree-census-database.html. This site has a search engine that 
allows one to rank cities by transit ridership and other commuting-related variables. 
 32. See Surface Transportation Policy Project, Mean Streets 2004, Executive Sum-
mary, available at http://www.transact.org/library/reports_html/ms2004/exec_sum.asp 
(reporting that over 4000 American pedestrians per year killed by automobile trafªc, 
and “the most dangerous places to walk are metropolitan areas marked by newer, 
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result, pedestrians must share streets with cars.33 In such cities, automo-
bile ownership is an “absolute necessity”34 for most residents. Bruegmann 
treats sprawl as the democratization of the country squire lifestyle35—but 
there is nothing democratic or egalitarian about a system that limits 
transportation to those who can participate in the suburban car culture. 
By contrast, residents of less sprawling regions have a variety of 
transportation options. For example, the majority of New York City resi-
dents get to work via public transit (as opposed to 1% of Oklahoma City 
residents),36 and the city has prosperous neighborhoods where most house-
holds do not even own cars.37 In metropolitan New York, transportation 
choice is not limited to city residents: New York City has some highly auto-
mobile-dependent suburbs38 but also has two suburbs where a majority of 
commuters use public transit regularly.39 In other words, New York ac-
commodates a wide variety of consumer preferences: preferences for city 
living, preferences for sprawl, and preferences for transit-oriented suburbia. 
Cities in some other afºuent countries are similar to New York City. 
Over 70% of Tokyo residents walk, bicycle, or ride transit to work, as do 
69% of Stockholm residents and 62% of Munich residents, respectively.40 If 
some afºuent places are less “sprawling” than others, it logically follows 
 
                                                     
low-density developments, where wide, high-speed arterial streets offer few side-
walks or crosswalks.”). 
 33. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (And Order In) The City, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 35 
(2004) (reporting that “wide residential streets without sidewalks” are now common); 
Ann DeFrange, Reader Stands Ready To Battle City’s Lack of Sidewalks, Oklahoman, 
June 9, 2004, at 19A, available at 2004 WLNR 21091635 (reporting that many Okla-
homa City streets lack sidewalks). See also Michael Lewyn, Buckhead—Don’t 
Even Think of Walking Here!, available at http://atlantaphotos.fotopic.net/p14010314. 
html, (photographic illustrations of residential streets without sidewalks); Michael 
Lewyn, Buford Highway—Another Bad Block for Pedestrians, available at http:// 
atlanta photos.fotopic. net/p14010301.html (showing photos of commercial streets 
without sidewalks). 
 34. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Eye That Never Sleeps: Privacy and Law in the Internet Era, 
40 Tulsa L. Rev. 561, 563 (2005). 
 35. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 10 (tying sprawl to “the democratization of society” 
as middle class now able “to exercise the choices that once were the sole prerogative 
of the wealthy and powerful.”). 
 36. See Carfree Census Database, supra note 31.  
 37. See City Data, 10162 Zip Code Detailed Proªle, available at http://www.city-
data.com/zips/10162.html (reporting that, in one New York City zip code with aver-
age household income of over $100,000, 550 of area’s 943 households had no car in 
2000). 
 38. See People v. Coutard, 454 N.Y.S. 2d 639, 642 (Dist. Ct. 1982) (“[I]n a suburban county 
such as [Nassau County], the use of an automobile by most of its citizens is often as 
necessary as placing bread upon their tables.”); David Alan Sklansky, Police and De-
mocracy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699, 1751 (2005) (describing Nassau County as New York 
City suburb). 
 39. See Carfee Census Database, supra note 31 (showing majority of residents in Hobo-
ken, New Jersey and Bronxville, New York, get to work by using public transit); 
Doug Halonen, Station Afªliates on Verge of Victory, Television Wk., Oct. 10, 2005, at 
1, available at 2005 WLNR 16892609 (characterizing Bronxville as a “swank New York 
suburb”); John Kelly, Trade Center Victims Were Mostly Men with Families, Houston 
Chron., Oct. 27, 2001, at A13, 2001 WLNR 11719685 (mentioning Hoboken on list of 
New York City suburbs). 
 40. Peter Newman & Jeffrey Kenworthy, Sustainability And Cities: Overcoming 
Automobile Dependence 83 (1999). 
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that public policy can affect the degree of sprawl in afºuent, democratic 
societies. In other words, some low-density development might be nor-
mal in an afºuent, democratic society—but not the degree of sprawl that 
makes constant driving a necessity for most people. 
Bruegmann implies that the differences between the United States and 
Europe are meaningless because even compact European cities have be-
come more suburbanized and automobile-dependent.41 In Europe, how-
ever, transit ridership has actually increased in recent years: in European 
Union countries, streetcar and subway ridership rose by 12.5% between 
1995 and 2003,42 and despite massive highway construction by European 
governments,43 the automobile’s share of European passenger transporta-
tion increased only slightly between 1995 and 2003 (from 74.1% of all pas-
senger miles to 74.4%).44 Furthermore, after losing population for decades, 
some European core cities have begun to regain population.45 
Even in the United States, there is some reason to believe that sprawl 
is not an unstoppable trend. American public transit ridership has risen 
by over 20% in the past decade46 and (as Bruegmann admits) some Ameri-
can cities are beginning to grow and to retain middle-class residents,47 
 
                                                     
 41. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 52 (citing numerous examples, including Paris’ loss 
of jobs to its suburbs); id. at 202 (“Just as in America, European urban dwellers are 
using their cars more and using public transportation less.”). 
 42. See European Commission, Energy and Transport in Figures 2005, Table 3.3.2, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/ªgures/pocketbook/doc/ 
2005/etif_2005_whole_en.pdf (“European Transport”) (listing growth rate for 
“Tram and Metro,” and adding that bus ridership grew by 3.7%). A “tram” is essen-
tially what Americans would term a “streetcar,” and a “Metro” what Americans would 
describe as a “subway.” See European Union, Commission Regulation No. 1192/2003 
(July 3, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_167/ 
l_16720030704en00130016.pdf (deªning terms).  
 43. See European Transport, supra note 42, Table 3.5.1 (length of motorways more than 
tripled in European Union countries between 1970 and 2001). 
 44. European Transport, supra note 42, Table 3.3.2. 
 45. See ISRA, ON A THEORY OF URBAN SPRAWL AND SPRAWLING 18, available at 
http://www.pik-potsdam.de/urbs/projekt/vienna_theory.pdf (stating that, accord-
ing to European Urban Audit, about half of European core cities gained population 
in 1990s, after losing people in earlier decades); Dep’t for Communities and Local 
Gov’t, Where Do We Stand?, available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/pub/ 
106/p1130106.jpg (chart depicting European Urban Audit). Moreover, central cities’ 
population losses in prior decades may have been caused not by consumer demand 
for sprawl but by government-funded highway construction (which encouraged 
suburban growth) and by regionwide population losses that depopulated city and 
suburb alike. See also Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 42 (distinguishing Europe because 
it did not experience a baby boom after World War II and, as a result, many regions 
suffered population decline); supra note 43 (noting growth of highway system in 
Europe), infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (explaining how highways pro-
mote suburban growth). 
 46. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Statistical Abstract of The 
United States: 2006 722 (125th ed. 2006) (showing that, after decreasing in early 
1990s, transit ridership rose from 7.7 billion passengers in 1995 to over 9.4 billion in 
2003) (“2006 Abstract”). See also Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 269 n.49 (admitting 
that “[t]ransit ridership, in the last few years, has risen faster than automobile travel” 
but claiming that this fact “has not been very meaningful” because transit ridership 
is so low). 
 47. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 51–56. 
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while some American suburbs have become more densely populated.48 
While some cities have continued to lose population,49 eight of America’s 
ten largest cities gained population between 1990 and 2000,50 including 
two (New York and Chicago) that had lost population in earlier decades.51 
Similarly, several smaller cities gained population in the 1990s after hav-
ing lost people in earlier decades.52 Thus, Bruegmann’s vision of sprawl as 
inevitable and natural is belied by the countertrends towards higher tran-
sit ridership and urban recovery. 
In sum, some sprawling development may be universal, but the 
amount of automobile-dependent development in a city or region has 
varied tremendously between cities, and the trend towards sprawl is no 
longer one-sided. Thus, sprawl in its most extreme forms is by no means 
inevitable in free, afºuent societies. 
 
B. Myth Two: The Market, Not Government, Created Sprawl 
Bruegmann’s theory that sprawl is “natural”53 implicitly rests upon 
the assumption that sprawl is almost entirely a result of consumer prefer-
ences, as expressed in the free market. If sprawl has been caused by gov-
ernment regulations and programs, sprawl is hardly inevitable or natural 
because there would be less sprawl in a more libertarian society. To his 
credit, Bruegmann (unlike some other pro-sprawl commentators)54 is at 
least willing to respond to arguments that sprawl has been partially 
caused by government policies rather than the free market.55 In particular, 
he admits that numerous commentators attribute sprawl to government 
highway spending,56 federal mortgage subsidies targeted towards subur-
 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 67–69.  
 49. See The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2006, supra note 29, at 480 (listing 
gains and losses of various cities). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. (showing that New York lost population between 1950 and 1980, and Chicago lost 
population between 1950 and 1990). 
 52. Id. (showing that Indianapolis, San Francisco, Fort Worth, Seattle, Boston, Denver, 
Portland, Kansas City, Atlanta, Omaha, Oakland, Minneapolis, Tampa, Madison, and 
Fort Wayne all lost population in the 1970s but regained residents in at least one of 
the following two decades). Ten of these ªfteen cities apparently continued to gain 
population between 2000 and 2004. See 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 32–35 (esti-
mating that Fort Worth, Indianapolis, Denver, Omaha, Seattle, Portland, Atlanta, 
Tampa, Kansas City, and Madison gained population while Boston, San Francisco, 
Oakland, Minneapolis, and Fort Wayne did not). 
 53. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 10 (claiming sprawl is perhaps a “predictable result 
of increasing wealth”). 
 54. See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, “Urban Sprawl” and Liberal Gall (June 29, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell062999.asp (attacking “a 
government-sponsored crusade against urban sprawl” without acknowledging the 
possibility of pro-sprawl government policies, and asserting that “[t]he real objection 
[to sprawl] may be that all this is going on without the guiding hand of Big Brother.”). 
 55. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 304–35; Gillham, supra note 1, at 15–16, 32–38, 42–45, 
134–36 (discussing how government policies have accelerated sprawl). 
 56. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 101–02. 
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ban homeowners,57 and pro-sprawl zoning regulations.58 Bruegmann’s 
responses to these arguments, however, are based on questionable logic. 
1. Do Highways Matter? 
Throughout the twentieth century, government at all levels favored 
highways over public transit.59 Government highway spending began 
early in the twentieth century60 but accelerated after 1956 when the fed-
eral government enacted the Interstate Highway Act, committing the fed-
eral government to paying ninety percent of the cost of America’s inter-
state highway network.61 In the decades immediately after the passage of 
the Highway Act, central cities lost population faster than ever before or 
afterward.62 Highway spending almost certainly accelerated suburbaniza-
tion: when a government builds a superhighway from downtown X to 
suburb Y, people who work downtown can commute more quickly from 
suburb Y to downtown X, and thus are more likely to move to suburb Y. 
By contrast, when dirt roads served suburb Y, it was far less appealing to 
commuters.63 
In addition to making suburbs more attractive to commuters, highways 
made cities less attractive to inhabitants by destroying urban neighbor-
hoods. Millions of houses in cities were bulldozed in order to create space 
for highways and other redevelopment schemes.64 For example, nearly 
20% of Baltimore’s African Americans were displaced by I-95 and I-83,65 
20,000 families in Miami were displaced by highway construction,66 and 
 
                                                     
 57. Id. at 102–04.  
 58. Id. at 105–06.  
 59. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 312–15 (giving a brief history of government support for 
highways). 
 60. Id. at 312–13. See also Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 101 (“Most cities and urban areas 
had extensive plans for superhighways already in the 1930s; many of them had allo-
cated large sums of county and state money to begin construction of these roads long 
before the federal interstate highway program of the mid-1950s.”). 
 61. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 35 (describing Interstate Highway Act in more detail).  
 62. Compare Patrick A. Simmons & Robert A. Lang, The Urban Turnaround, in Redeªning 
Urban & Suburban America 51, 54 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 2003) (older 
cities lost more population in 1960s and 1970s than in earlier or later decades) with 
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of The United 
States: 1952 18–21 (73d ed. 1952) (before the passage of the Highway Act, of eighteen 
cities with population over 500,000, all but four gained population during 1930s, and 
all but one gained population during 1940s). 
 63. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that highways “improved access between 
city and suburb, making it easier to commute to ever more distant outlying areas.”); 
Lewyn, supra note 30, at 321 (citation omitted) (reporting that when National Asso-
ciation of Home Builders asked what amenity would encourage them to move to a 
new area, 55% of respondents picked highway access, more than any alternative). 
 64. See Tullock v. State Highway Comm’n of Mo., 507 F.2d 712, 714 n.1 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(showing that between 1950 and 1968, over two million dwellings destroyed due to 
highway construction and urban renewal). Sixty-two thousand individuals and fami-
lies were displaced by federal highway programs in 1968 alone). Cf. Gillham, supra 
note 1, at 42–43 (describing “urban renewal” program mentioned in Tullock). 
 65. Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide: Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone Astray?, 
21 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 345, 370 (1997). 
 66. See Andrea Eaton, Impact of Urban Renewal or Land Development Initiatives on African-
American Neighborhoods in Dade County, Florida, 3 How. Scroll 49, 55 (1995). 
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19,000 Clevelanders were displaced by one downtown freeway.67 Even 
neighborhoods not destroyed by highways were damaged by expressway 
construction. For example, before the enactment of the Highway Act, Clai-
borne Avenue was the main street of the Treme section of New Orleans, 
with 200 businesses and a 6100-foot median.68 Highway bureaucrats built 
I-10 on Claiborne Avenue, cutting the neighborhood in half and turning 
the median into a strip of dirt.69 After the destruction of Claiborne Avenue, 
Treme deteriorated: a more recent survey of area businesses showed that 
63% of business owners would not invest in another business in the 
neighborhood because of the neighborhood’s physical unattractiveness 
and high crime.70 
Since the government did not always replace housing units that were 
destroyed in order to make room for highways, highway construction re-
duced the urban housing supply and, in turn, the city population. In Cin-
cinnati, for example, the construction of I-75 displaced residents of the 
city’s African American West End. The displaced West Enders thus ºooded 
nearby neighborhoods (causing massive racial transition and “white ºight” 
from those neighborhoods).71 One such neighborhood, Mount Auburn, 
changed from 84% white in 1960 to 74% black in 1970;72 presumably, at 
least some of the whites who left Mount Auburn moved to Cincinnati’s 
suburbs. 
When a city loses population to its suburbs, it may become less attrac-
tive in a variety of other ways. For example, the city’s tax base might de-
cline, forcing the city to raise taxes to pay for city services.73 Moreover, if 
the people who leave the city are disproportionately middle- and upper-
class, the remaining, relatively low-income residents might support redis-
 
                                                     
 67. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 316 (citation omitted). 
 68. Beverly H. Wright, New Orleans Neighborhoods Under Siege, in Just Transportation 
121, 132–33 (Robert D. Bullard & Glenn S. Johnston eds., 1997).  
 69. Id. at 133–34. 
 70. Id. at 135. 
 71. See Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 1993 WL 761489, at *7 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1993) (noting 
that, in Cincinnati, “African American citizens were being forced to move into previ-
ously white neighborhoods as a result of being displaced by the construction of the 
Interstate Highway through their neighborhood,” thus implying that government 
did not provide replacement housing in their neighborhoods to people whose homes 
were destroyed due to highway construction); Dan Hurley, New Y, Old Vision for the 
West End, Cincinnati Post, May 26, 2006, available at http://news.cincypost.com/ 
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060526/LIFE/605260340/-1/BACK01 (reporting that 
West End was an African-African neighborhood in which many homes were de-
stroyed by I-75); Lewyn, supra note 30, at 316 (displaced West End residents ºooded 
nearby neighborhoods). 
 72. Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just An Environmental Issue, 84 Marq. L. Rev. 
301, 316 n.128 (citation omitted). 
 73. See Katharine J. Jackson, The Need For Regional Management of Growth: Boulder, Colo-
rado As A Case Study, 37 Urb. Law. 299, 303 (2005) (“[A]s a city’s population shrinks, 
property values and property tax bases decrease, ‘forcing [the city] to raise taxes to 
pay for basic city services.’”); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742, 750 
n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (“[C]ities are trying to reverse the population movements that 
have left them with concentrations of the poor, high service demands, and a stagnant 
tax base.”). 
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tributionist policies that increase taxes and drive away even more middle-
class voters.74 
Nevertheless, Bruegmann speculates that highways may have actu-
ally helped cities, noting that roads “were heavily supported by central-
city interests because these individuals believed that these roads, like the 
railroads before them, would reinforce the centrality of the downtown 
and make it easier for people from throughout the region to get to it.”75 
However, Bruegmann does not explain why he thinks this view is cor-
rect.76 Similarly, he asserts that, “[g]iven the strong rebound of many of 
these cities in recent years, it is altogether possible that, at some point in 
the near future, most people will conclude that [expressways] were actu-
ally largely beneªcial for central cities.”77 Again, Bruegmann does not ex-
plain why “most people” would reach this conclusion. In fact, his conclu-
sion seems highly implausible, given the rapid decline of cities during the 
years immediately after the passage of the Highway Act.78 If cities re-
bound, their success is likely to be despite, not because of, the highways 
that fed suburban growth. 
Bruegmann’s weakest argument is that suburb-oriented government 
spending merely compensates for urban-oriented government spending. 
For example, he argues that “federal spending today goes more heavily 
per capita to central cities than to suburbs, primarily because of the enor-
mous price tag of social security payments, which go primarily to an 
older population that remains disproportionately in the central cities.”79 
Even if it was true that senior citizens mostly lived in central cities,80 So-
cial Security payments do not compensate for highway spending because 
Social Security spending goes to a retiree whether she lives in a city or a 
suburb. By contrast, highways going from a city to a suburb beneªt sub-
urbanites by shortening their commutes, but arguably harm city residents 
both by destroying city neighborhoods and by encouraging outmigration 
 
                                                     
 74. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 336–38 (discussing Washington, D.C., under Marion 
Barry as a case study of high-tax government caused by ºight of middle-class voters 
from city electorate). 
 75. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 108.  
 76. It is unclear whether Bruegmann actually believes that highways help downtowns. 
He writes that highways “made leaving town easier” but then writes that “both [high-
ways and railroads] caused some dispersal and both caused some centralization.” Id. 
The ªrst remark suggests that highways did cause sprawl, while the second state-
ment is more equivocal. 
 77. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 101–02.  
 78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 79. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 105. 
 80. In fact, this is not always the case. For example, in New York, Los Angeles, and Chi-
cago, the percentage of central city population over 65 is actually lower than the per-
centage of metropolitan area population over 65. See U.S. Census Bureau, Cities 
With 100,000 Or More Population in 2000 Ranked by Percent Population 65 
Years and Over, 2000 in Alphabetic Order, available at http://www.census.gov/ 
statab/ccdb/cit2061a.txt (in New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago, percentages 
of urban population over 65 were 11.7%, 9.7%, and 10.3% respectively); U.S. Census 
Bureau, Metropolitan Area Rankings of Persons 65 Years of Age and Over, 
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/metro09.prn (comparable percent-
ages for New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago metropolitan areas were 13.4%, 10.2%, 
and 11.3%, respectively). 
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from cities (thus reducing urban tax bases, leading to higher taxes).81 In 
other words, Social Security spending is place-neutral—but highway 
spending is not. 
2. Housing Subsidies 
Since the 1930s the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has in-
sured home construction loans in order to stimulate the housing indus-
try.82 Speciªcally, the FHA guaranteed over 90% of the value of collateral 
for home loans so that down payments of only 10% of home value be-
came the norm (as opposed to the 33% down payments common before 
FHA’s creation).83 For the ªrst few decades of its existence, the FHA re-
fused to guarantee home loans in racially integrated areas.84 Since subur-
ban areas were usually whiter than cities,85 this policy encouraged Ameri-
cans to purchase FHA-insured homes in suburbs.86 
Bruegmann apparently defends the FHA’s racist policies, asserting 
that “there was, in fact, a great deal of evidence over many years indicat-
ing that property values did tend to drop as neighborhoods got older and 
experienced ethnic or racial turnover.”87 Even if Bruegmann’s claim is fac-
tually correct,88 he overlooks the possibility that subsidies such as FHA 
 
                                                     
 81. See supra notes 62–74 and accompanying text (describing the impact of highways 
upon cities). Bruegmann also asserts that in any city/suburb accounting, “the spend-
ing by the federal government since the eighteenth century for ports and railroads, 
bridges and highways, universities and hospitals located primarily in the central cit-
ies would have to be factored in.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 105. This argument 
lacks merit for two reasons. First, since government was far smaller prior to the 1950s 
than it is today, such expenses were not always government-ªnanced. See Eric A. 
Cesnik, The American Street, 33 Urb. Law. 147, 167 (2001) (explaining that streets were 
often privately ªnanced until the twentieth century); U.S. Ofªce of Mgmt. and 
Budget, Budget of The United States Gov’t: Historical Tables, Fiscal Year 2007 
23–24 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/hist.pdf 
(showing that federal spending was only 3.4% of GNP in 1930, grew to 11.6% of GNP 
in 1948, and is now about 20% of GNP); id. at 312–13 (showing that state and local 
government spending grew from 5.6% of GNP in 1948 to over 11% of GNP today). 
Second, highway spending, as noted above, was often not beneªcial for cities. See su-
pra notes 62–74 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 37; Lewyn, supra note 30, at 305. 
 83. See Victor A. Bolden, Where Does New York City Go From Here: Chaos or Community, 23 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1031, 1052 n.26 (1996). 
 84. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of The 
United States 207–08 (1985); Gillham, supra note 1, at 135. 
 85. The racial difference between cities and suburbs may itself have been due to subur-
ban governments’ zoning policies that excluded inexpensive housing, thus keeping 
African Americans out of those suburbs. See John Powell, Segregation and Educational 
Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 337, 352 (1996) 
(explaining that, because blacks are poorer than whites, suburban exclusion of inex-
pensive housing excludes African Americans from suburbs). 
 86. Gillham, supra note 1, at 134–35. 
 87. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 102. He also states that “[n]o amount of regulatory con-
trol would have altered this fact of life.” Id. The FHA, however, was not trying to 
“control” private racism but, rather, to subsidize such racism—a very different issue.  
 88. Bruegmann provides no evidence for this assertion. Although he does footnote this 
statement, his footnote relates to an entirely different issue: the anti-urban bias of an 
entirely different government agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC). 
HOLC “redlined” urban neighborhoods by issuing maps that graded neighborhoods 
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loan insurance might make moving to suburbia cheaper at the margin: 
that is, some people might be willing to leave a low-value urban neighbor-
hood if they could make a 10% down payment on a suburban home, but 
would not be willing to move if they had to make a 33% down payment 
on a suburban home. To the extent that would-be homeowners fell into 
this category, FHA mortgage insurance encouraged suburban growth. 
Moreover, the FHA’s tilt towards suburbia included a variety of poli-
cies unrelated to racial turnover. The FHA deªned “low-risk” areas ap-
propriate for FHA loans not just as “lily-white” neighborhoods, but also 
as neighborhoods that were newer and less compact—policies that fa-
vored suburbia because suburbs tended to be newer and less densely 
populated.89 FHA also set minimum standards for new housing construc-
tion that mandated low-density, automobile-dependent design.90 Thus, 
FHA policies both subsidized migration to suburbs and mandated that 
those suburbs be designed in a “sprawling” manner. 
As a result of these policies, the overwhelming majority of FHA-insured 
homes were in suburbs, even where nearby central cities were predomi-
nantly white. For example, in metropolitan St. Louis, 91% of new homes 
insured by the FHA during the 1930s were in suburban locations,91 even 
though the city of St. Louis was less than 12% black in 1930.92 
 
                                                     
and colored the riskiest areas red. Amy Hillier, Redlining in Philadelphia, avail-
able at http://cml.upenn.edu/redlining/intro.html. Bruegmann writes that HOLC’s 
inºuence was limited because it did not make its maps available to private lenders. 
Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 248 n.12. However, Amy Hillier, the researcher cited by 
Bruegmann, has pointed out that HOLC was far less inºuential than FHA. See Hill-
ier, supra (stating that the FHA manuals “established highly racialized neighborhood 
standards that lenders were encouraged to consider if they wanted to receive FHA 
insurance. FHA’s neighborhood appraisal standards ultimately had a much greater 
impact on lending patterns in urban communities than HOLC’s maps.”). Thus, 
Bruegmann’s footnote does not support either his broad claim that FHA’s anti-urban 
bias was unimportant or his narrower claim that racial integration lowers property 
values.  
 89. See Jackson, supra note 84, at 207–08 (describing FHA policies and quoting FHA 
manuals asserting that “crowded neighborhoods lessen desirability” as do “older 
properties in a neighborhood”). 
 90. Compare Michael Southworth & Eran Ben-Joseph, Regulated Streets: The Evo-
lution of Standards for Suburban Residential Streets 34–36 (1993) (showing 
that the FHA favored cul-de-sacs over grid streets, houses sitting on at least 6000 
square feet of land, and blocks at least 600 feet long) with Reid Ewing, Pedestrian- 
and Transit-Friendly Design: A Primer for Smart Growth 2–4, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/ptfd_primer.pdf (arguing pedestrian-friendly, 
transit-friendly development requires higher densities than are common in many 
suburbs and blocks no longer than 300 feet; higher density means more people can 
walk to transit stops, and short blocks mean pedestrians can cross streets more fre-
quently) and Duany Et Al., supra note 9, at 23 (explaining that the cul-de-sac street 
pattern discourages walking because residential streets are not connected to each 
other, which means pedestrians must go out of their way to visit nearby residential 
streets). 
 91. Gillham, supra note 1, at 135 (citing data for St. Louis, and citing similar results for 
other metropolitan areas). 
 92. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of The United States 1935 25 
(57th ed. 1935), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/ 
1935-02.pdf (showing that the city of St. Louis was 11.6% black). 
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More plausibly, Bruegmann points out that the federal income tax de-
duction for interest on mortgages does not favor suburbs because this de-
duction can be used for “any kind of single-family unit, whether a house 
in the suburbs or a condominium in a high-rise downtown.”93 Even here, 
however, Bruegmann oversimpliªes. Condominiums were not common 
(or even authorized by most states’ statutes) until the 1960s.94 Before that 
time, Americans could not easily purchase apartments95 and thus had to 
buy a house in order to qualify for the home mortgage deduction. Be-
cause houses tend to be disproportionately located in suburbs,96 the home 
mortgage deduction tended to favor migration to suburbia until the 
1960s. 
3. Zoning 
As Bruegmann admits, municipal zoning codes often mandate segre-
gation of housing from other land uses and require low population den-
sity.97 These policies, by increasing the distance between housing and 
other land uses, ensure that many Americans cannot live within walking 
distance of shops or ofªces, thus effectively forcing Americans into their 
cars.98 Nevertheless, Bruegmann asserts that “zoning itself cannot be blamed 
for most of the sprawl that has occurred because sprawl was well under-
way long before zoning became common in American cities, which only 
started to happen in the 1920s.”99 Bruegmann’s suggestion that “most of 
the sprawl that has occurred” preceded zoning is misleading. As of 2003, 
there were 105.8 million occupied housing units in the United States.100 
Only 9.6 million of these units (or about 9%) were built before 1920.101 
Thus, most of America’s housing was created after zoning became com-
mon. 
Bruegmann also suggests that, because some suburbs have become 
more densely populated in recent years, “zoning has changed as neces-
 
                                                     
 93. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 103.  
 94. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 59 (stating that “it wasn’t until the 1960s that the con-
dominium was introduced here.”); Aaron M. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Develop-
ment: Condominium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1104, 1109–10 
(1969) (explaining that the ªrst state statute dealing with condominiums was in 1958, 
and federal mortgage insurance for condominiums was not available until 1961). 
 95. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 59 (explaining that the condominium form of owner-
ship “made it possible for city dwellers to own rather than rent their apartments.”). 
 96. See Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing The Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with 
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 
839 (1999) (explaining that suburbs often exclude or restrict construction of apart-
ments through zoning). 
 97. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 105. 
 98. Cf. Andres Duany & Emily Talen, Making the Good Easy: The Smart Code Alternative, 29 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1445, 1447 (2002) (explaining that, in neighborhoods organized 
around “the mobility pattern of the pedestrian,” most residents should live no more 
than a quarter of a mile from stores and schools). 
 99. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 105. 
100. U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United States, 2003, 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs03/tab1a1.htm.  
101. Id. About 11.8 million units were built between 1920 and 1940, 21.5 million between 
1940 and 1960, 40 million between 1960 and 1980, and 38.7 million after 1980. 
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sary to accommodate market realities”102—in other words, that zoning 
merely mimics the market, mandating sprawl when the market wants 
sprawl and changing when the market wants change. 
A few lines later, however, Bruegmann concedes that zoning occa-
sionally frustrates the market, asserting that low-density zoning designed 
to prevent rural areas from turning into suburbs “almost certainly forced 
many landowners to buy more land than they otherwise would have 
wanted, leading to lower densities than would have been the case with-
out the regulations.”103 Bruegmann’s treatment of zoning thus seems to be 
governed by a double standard: conventional pro-sprawl zoning merely 
tracks the market while zoning designed to limit sprawl successfully frus-
trates consumer demand. 
Moreover, surveys of developers suggest that pro-sprawl land use 
regulation really does impede, rather than follow, market pressures for 
more compact housing. In 2001, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a devel-
opers’ trade association,104 conducted a survey asking developers about 
the impact of zoning upon “alternatives to conventional, low-density, 
automobile-oriented, suburban development.”105 According to the survey, 
85.4% of developers agreed that the supply of such development was in-
adequate to meet market demand,106 and 78.2% of developers identiªed 
government regulation as a signiªcant barrier to such development.107 
The ULI survey also revealed that over sixty percent of developers in both 
cities and inner suburbs stated that they wished to build more compact 
development than was generally allowable under government regula-
tion.108 
For example, in California’s Silicon Valley, exploding housing prices 
might, in the absence of government regulation, cause landowners to 
build smaller houses and more multifamily developments in order to 
meet consumer demand for affordable housing.109 In Silicon Valley com-
munities such as Santa Clara and Cupertino, however, almost every prop-
 
                                                     
102. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 106. 
103. Id. at 106–07. 
104. Jonathan Levine, Zoned Out: Regulation, Markets, and Choices in Transpor-
tation and Metropolitan Land-Use 125 (2006) (describing ULI as “national or-
ganization of land developers”). 
105. Id. at 126. 
106. Id. at 128. This group was divided between 66.8% who believed that there was gen-
erally not enough compact development to meet consumer demand and an addi-
tional 18.6% who responded that the supply of such development was high enough 
to meet consumer demand but not in the “right locations” (presumably meaning the 
neighborhoods where consumer demand for compact development was highest). Id. 
107. Id. at 129. By contrast, only 35.3% invoked ªnancing as an obstacle to more compact 
development, and only 26.3% listed inadequate consumer demand. Id. Thus, it can-
not plausibly be argued that pedestrian-friendly development is rare solely because 
of lack of market demand.  
108. Levine, supra note 104, at 131. In particular, about 80% of developers indicated that 
they would develop more compactly in inner suburbs if zoning was less burden-
some, and over 60% similarly indicated that relaxed regulations would lead them to 
develop more densely in central cities. Id. By contrast, developers in outer suburbs 
and rural areas were less interested in more compact development. See id. 
109. See id. at 77. 
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erty zoned as single-family in the 1960s remains single-family today.110 
Similarly, in Massachusetts only three-tenths of one percent of single-
family parcels were rezoned between 1970 and 1999,111 despite the fact 
that housing prices near Boston have exploded.112 Thus, zoning does not 
always respond to consumer demand for more compact development.113 
C. Myth Three: Sprawl Is Harmless 
Even if government spending and government zoning policies have 
depopulated cities and made suburbia automobile-dependent, sprawl is 
hardly a serious social problem if its overall effects are harmless or beneª-
cial. Therefore, Bruegmann attacks a wide variety of claims about the evil 
effects of sprawl. Bruegmann’s rebuttal of some anti-sprawl claims is 
fairly persuasive, given the difªculty of establishing cause-and-effect rela-
tionships between sprawl and other social problems. For example, Brueg-
mann correctly suggests that there is no way of knowing whether limiting 
sprawl will reduce energy consumption enough to reduce global warm-
ing.114 Similarly, it is not clear whether sprawl costs suburban taxpayers 
signiªcantly more than compact development,115 or whether sprawl will 
ever reduce food supply by creating a shortage of farmland.116 
 
                                                     
110. Id. at 204 n.1. 
111. Id. at 78. 
112. See Edward L. Glaeser, Jenny Schuetz & Bryce Ward, Regulation and the Rise 
of Housing Prices in Greater Boston 1, 7 (2006), available at http://www.ksg.harvard. 
edu/rappaport/downloads/housing_regulations/regulation_housingprices.pdf 
(housing prices grew by 210% in metro Boston between 1980 and 2004, while number 
of permits decreased). 
113. Indeed, local governments have a strong political incentive to ignore consumer de-
mand for new housing of any type: the homeowners who often dominate local elec-
torates may wish to preserve the status quo in order to keep housing scarce and thus 
keep property values high. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Regulation and the Four Dimen-
sions of Class in Land Use, 22 J.L. & Pol. 33, 39–40 (2006) (explaining local government 
incentives behind rigid zoning laws); Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 162 (describing 
homeowners as part of “incumbents’ club” that beneªts from restrictions on housing 
supply). 
114. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 149 (“Even if everyone in the world came to live in 
the same way as the inhabitants of European central cities, this would certainly not, 
in itself, solve the global warming problem.”) Of course, if sprawl increases pollu-
tion, it probably contributes in some degree to global warming. See also infra notes 
116–123 and accompanying text (describing relationship between sprawl and pollu-
tion). However, there is no way of knowing how signiªcant that contribution is. 
115. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 125. I note, however, that even if sprawl does not 
affect suburban or statewide tax burdens, sprawl may increase the taxes of urban 
taxpayers under certain circumstances. See Lewyn, supra note 30, at 336–37 (stating 
that, where new development is outside city limits, city taxes may increase because: 
(1) “if a city’s middle class migrates en masse to suburbia, its tax base will be smaller 
and it, therefore, will, other things being equal, have to raise taxes or reduce ser-
vices”; and (2) a poorer city electorate is more likely to favor redistributive ªscal poli-
cies). 
116. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 142 (arguing that sprawl does not endanger food 
supplies because, so far, “agricultural yields are going up and agricultural prices go-
ing down worldwide despite a reduction in the amount of land devoted to agricul-
ture”). 
96 g Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal g Vol. 23, 2007 
Bruegmann’s handling of other issues, however, is far less supple. He 
attempts, for example, to deny the link between air pollution117 and 
sprawl by writing that the “cause of the pollution was neither sprawl nor 
the automobile itself but, rather, the inefªcient fuel source it used.”118 As 
long as automobiles are using those inefªcient fuel sources, however, they 
are creating pollution. It logically follows that, by increasing driving, sprawl 
increases pollution. Perhaps someday automobiles will use more efªcient 
fuel sources; until that day comes, however,119 more sprawl (other factors 
being equal) means more driving which, in turn, means more pollution. 
Bruegmann even tries to blame pollution on city-dwellers by asserting 
that “the higher density of automobile usage in the city meant that pollu-
tion was almost invariably worse in dense areas.”120 Even if this statement 
is factually correct,121 the “higher density of automobile use” in the city is 
partly caused by suburbanites driving from automobile-dependent sub-
urbs and urbanites driving to jobs in those suburbs.122 If these drivers 
lived and worked in places where they could get to work without driving 
(rather than in sprawling, automobile-dependent suburbs), dense areas 
might have fewer cars on their streets, and thus less automobile-induced 
 
                                                     
117. Air pollution is distinguishable from global warming because, even if global warm-
ing never becomes a signiªcant social problem, air pollution creates day-to-day 
health hazards such as lung damage. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 121 (stating that 
pollution causes damage to lung tissue as well as “reproductive and neurological 
problems”). 
118. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 127. Bruegmann inexplicably adds: “For many of those 
in the anti-suburban camp, however, developing new and cleaner fuel sources was 
the last thing they wanted. It would only lead to more driving and more sprawl.” Id. 
This unveriªable claim exempliªes the ad hominem fallacy: Bruegmann is trying to 
“shift [his] argument from the point being discussed (ad rem) to irrelevant personal 
characteristics of an opponent (ad hominem). Instead of addressing the issue pre-
sented by an opponent, this argument makes the opponent the issue.” Paul E. Sal-
manca, Constitutional Protection for Conversations Between Therapists and Clients, 64 Mo. 
L.Rev. 77, 97 n.106 (1999) (citation omitted). The sentence quoted seeks to persuade 
readers by attacking the alleged “anti-suburban camp” rather than focusing on the 
relationship between sprawl and pollution. 
119. And maybe even after that day comes, if auto travel increases faster than fuel 
efªciency. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 114 (Environmental Protection Agency pro-
jects that, although cars are less toxic than they were in 1970, “growth in VMT [vehi-
cle miles traveled] will offset progress in reducing air toxics by early this century, 
causing air pollution from highway vehicles to actually increase within the next 
twenty years.”). 
120. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 127. 
121. In fact, it is by no means clear that compact places are more polluted. See Michael 
Lewyn, Sprawl, Growth Boundaries and the Rehnquist Court, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 1, 47 
(2002) (showing pollution ªgures for various metropolitan areas, and concluding that 
“[m]etropolitan areas with high levels of public transit use tend to have relatively 
clean air.”).  
122. For example, in metropolitan Baltimore, 10% of all workers commute from city to 
suburb and 11% commute from suburb to city. See Baltimore Metro. Council, TSC 
Notes, available at http://www.baltometro.org/mambo/content/view/611/0/ 
#household. Many of these suburbs are extremely automobile-dependent. See Job 
Opportunities Task Force, Baltimore’s Choice: Workers and Jobs for a Thriv-
ing Economy 22, available at http://www.jotf.org/pdf/baltimoreschoice.pdf (report-
ing statistics that indicate mass transit service is minimal in Baltimore’s growing outer 
suburbs). 
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air pollution.123 Thus, sprawl (other factors being equal) increases auto-
mobile-induced pollution even in central cities. 
Bruegmann’s treatment of the relationship between sprawl and obe-
sity is similarly illogical. He writes that “ethnic and racial characteristics 
and low income are much more closely associated with obesity than any 
particular land-use pattern.”124 This claim presents a false dichotomy: ei-
ther poverty causes obesity or sprawl causes obesity. The claim ignores the 
possibility, however, that both may be causes: poor people may be more 
likely to be obese than rich people, but poor people (or for that matter, 
not-so-poor people) living in a neighborhood that discourages walking may 
also be even more likely to be obese than other people with similar in-
comes. 
Furthermore, Bruegmann’s attempt to break the link between sprawl 
and trafªc congestion rests on a slender factual base. At ªrst glance, it 
might seem obvious that suburban life might increase driving, which, in 
turn, increases congestion. Bruegmann defends sprawl, however, on the 
grounds that “congestion and commuting times tend to rise, not fall, with 
density.”125 For example, Bruegmann cites Kansas City and Oklahoma 
City as role models of low-density places with little trafªc congestion. In-
deed, like most smaller cities, they do have less congestion than bigger 
cities.126 Bruegmann’s own examples, however, rebut his claim. If Brueg-
mann’s theory was correct, these low-density cities would have experi-
enced reduced trafªc congestion if their densities fell over time. This re-
duced trafªc congestion did not occur in Kansas City, however, where 
regionwide population density decreased by over 20% (from 1982 persons 
per square mile to 1435)—while the annual congestion-related delay per 
rush-hour traveler rose from 2 hours per year to 17 hours per year.127 In 
Oklahoma City, moreover, population density did not change signiªcantly 
(increasing slightly from 1524 persons per square mile to 1568) but con-
gestion nevertheless increased from 3 hours per year to 12 hours per 
 
                                                     
123. Even in a city where all commuters drove to work, commuting to and from distant 
suburbs may increase urban pollution if a commuter driving to or from suburbia 
drives more miles within the city than she would have driven if she lived in the city 
and drove to a job in the city. 
124. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 256 n.14. 
125. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 141. 
126. See Texas Transportation Institute, 2005 Urban Mobility Study, National 
Congestion Tables, Table 1, available at http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_ 
data/tables/national/table_1.pdf (listing congestion for various regions and noting 
that largest regions had the most congestion while smaller regions had the least). The 
Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) is a state research agency afªliated with Texas 
A&M University, which regularly conducts “urban mobility studies” addressing trafªc 
congestion. See Lewyn, supra note 121, at 43 (describing TTI); Bruegmann, supra note 
1, at 255 n.8 (citing TTI data). 
127. Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Kansas City, MO-KS, available at 
http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/kansas_city.pdf. It could be 
argued, of course, that places such as Kansas City failed to build enough roads to ac-
commodate trafªc. See infra notes 159–168 and accompanying text (discussing rela-
tionship between road construction and congestion). This argument is weak because, 
if lower density reduces congestion, Kansas City’s decreased density should have 
reduced trafªc without any need for massive road construction. 
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year.128 Thus, sprawl has failed to reduce congestion, even in low-density, 
low-congestion regions. 
Bruegmann also claims that commuting times have not increased due 
to sprawl because jobs have followed population to the suburbs.129 In fact, 
however, the percentage of workers with ninety-minute round-trip com-
mutes has increased by 95% since 1990.130 As a matter of common sense, 
such long-distance commutes may be an inevitable result of sprawl: if 
Employer X moves from downtown to northern suburb Y, its employees 
who live in northern suburb Y may have shorter commutes but its urban 
employees and its employees in southern suburbs may have even longer 
commutes.131 
More important than the anti-sprawl arguments Bruegmann mishan-
dles are the arguments that he simply ignores. His chapter discussing the 
social costs of sprawl contains a subheading for “Social Concerns and Eq-
uity Problems”132 but his discussion under that subheading completely over-
looks a major “equity problem” with sprawl—the plight of the carless 
young, old, poor, and disabled who lack access to jobs and shopping when 
streets are unªt for pedestrians and transit service is inadequate.133 Almost 
one-third of all Americans have no drivers’ license,134 including about 11.5% 
of Americans over eighteen.135 This ªgure almost certainly understates the 
number of non-drivers, since some Americans acquired a drivers’ license 
 
                                                     
128. Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Oklahoma City, OK, available at 
http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/oklahoma_city.pdf. 
129. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 141 (“[T]he notion that sprawl causes congestion or 
longer commuting trips is difªcult to sustain in the face of data that show that com-
muting times in the United States did not increase very much . . . . The reason was 
that the decentralization of residences was accompanied by a decentralization of jobs 
and other activities”). I note that despite the decentralization of employment, subur-
banites continue to have longer commutes than city residents. See Surface Transp. 
Pol. Project, Transp. Data From the 2000 Census, available at http://www.osc. 
state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/pop_trends.pdf (reporting that average subur-
banite spends 26.9 minutes traveling to work as opposed to 24.9 for central city resi-
dents).  
130. Michelle Conlin et al., Extreme Commuting, available at http://www.business 
week.com/magazine/content/05_08/b3921127.htm. 
131. See Steve Belmont, Cities In Full 149 (2002) (explaining this point in more detail). 
132. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 143. Instead of focusing upon the effects of sprawl upon 
non-drivers generally, he focuses on the question of whether cities should annex 
suburbs in order to improve urban tax bases, id. at 143-45—an important but not na-
tionwide problem, since in many regions, cities have been able to annex a signiªcant 
portion of their suburbs. See Gillham, supra note 1, at 141 (ªnding that of twenty 
largest U.S. cities, seven were able to annex over 100 miles of suburban territory be-
tween 1950 and 1990). 
133. See supra notes 9, 30–34 and accompanying text (noting difªculty of life for American 
non-drivers, and pointing out that young, old and poor are especially likely to suffer 
from such problems). 
134. See 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 8, 712 (showing that of the 290.7 million resi-
dents of the United States in 2003, only 196.1 million were licensed drivers, or about 
67% of resident population). 
135. Of the 217.7 million persons over 18 in the United States, 25 million have no driver’s 
license. Id. at 13 (217.7 million persons over 18 lived in United States in 2003); Spada-
fora, supra note 29, at 117 (after subtraction of 3.4 million under-18 drivers, table 
shows 192.7 million licensed drivers in 2003). 
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at one time but do not own a car.136 Non-drivers tend to be among the 
most physically and economically disadvantaged members of American 
society. Twenty-one percent of Americans over sixty-ªve do not drive,137 
most children obviously do not drive,138 almost half of disabled Americans 
have no car,139 and the majority of welfare recipients do not own cars.140 
Non-drivers, however, are not characters in Bruegmann’s story of 
suburban triumph.141 In fact, Brugemann is an aggressive defender of 
government-funded road construction,142 apparently ignoring the possi-
bility that, by moving jobs to suburbia, expressways move jobs to areas 
far from public transit and thus inaccessible to people without cars.143 De-
spite Bruegmann’s attempts to tie sprawl to freedom,144 he is a huge pro-
ponent of “Big Government” if it supports suburbia—even if “Big Gov-
ernment’s” decisions reduce the mobility of non-drivers. 
Instead of discussing the impact of sprawl upon the carless poor and 
disabled, Bruegmann uses class-war tactics to defend sprawl by charac-
terizing the public debate over sprawl as a conºict between the middle 
class, which allegedly beneªts from the opportunity to move to suburbia, 
and the upper class, which wants suburbia all to itself.145 Bruegmann’s 
tale of class war is incomplete, however, because it overlooks the impact 
of sprawl upon the poor who cannot afford cars146 or suburban homes.147 
 
                                                     
136. In seven states, the number of licensed drivers actually exceeds the number of regis-
tered motor vehicles, a fact suggesting that some license holders do not actually pos-
sess a motor vehicle. Id. at 118. For example, some people with drivers’ licenses may 
have given up cars after moving to a neighborhood where auto ownership was not 
necessary, or may live in a household with a family member who owns a car.  
137. See Plungis & Bunkley, supra note 9. 
138. Spadafora, supra note 29, at 118 (showing that in most states, the minimum age for a 
learner’s permit is 15 or over). 
139. See Julie Mason, Bush Unveils Program for Disabled, Houston Chron., June 29, 2000, 
at A11, available at 2000 WNLR 9368643 (according to Karen Hughes, spokeswoman 
for then-Governor Bush, 25 million of 54 million disabled Americans were depend-
ent on public transportation). 
140. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the 
Urban Poor, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 173, 183 n.61 (2001). 
141. Bruegmann does mention that “[t]here are probably good reasons to provide more 
subsidies to some forms of public transportation in the United States today.” Brueg-
mann, supra note 1, at 147. He fails, however, to state what those “good reasons” are 
and what “forms” are most deserving. 
142. See id. at 192–94. Cf. supra notes 62–74 and accompanying text (discussing the subur-
banizing impact of highways). 
143. See Garnett, supra note 140, at 183 (“[W]hile most suburban jobs are readily accessible 
by car, only a small percentage are accessible by public transit.”). 
144. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that sprawl is “the preferred settlement 
pattern everywhere in the world where there is a certain measure of afºuence and 
where citizens have some choice in where they live.”). 
145. Id. at 115 (“As long as only a small number of the wealthiest and most powerful 
families occupied the most land in the most attractive locations, there was very little 
sustained or organized protest”); see also id. at 125 (describing the “middle-class sub-
urbia” under attack by “upper-middle class citizen[s]”); id. at 135 (describing one 
popular song’s lyrics about “ticky tacky” suburban housing as “criticism of working-
class and middle-class culture”). 
146. See Garnett, supra note 140, at 183 & n.61 (noting that most welfare recipients do not 
own cars). 
147. See Georgette Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 607, 616 n.31 (1997) (noting that poor often cannot afford to live in sub-
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Bruegmann likewise overlooks the ªscal impact of compulsory motor-
ing upon the vehicle-owning majority. The average American household 
spends $6,960 on vehicle purchases, gasoline, vehicle maintenance and 
repair, and vehicle insurance.148 To the extent that vehicle ownership is a 
virtually compulsory result of government policy,149 these expenditures 
are essentially a government-imposed tax, similar to the income tax or 
property taxes.150 
Bruegmann writes that sprawl creates “mobility, privacy and choice.”151 
Where (as in large chunks of the United States) sprawl is so all-encom-
passing that automobiles are necessities rather than luxuries, however, 
sprawl actually limits the mobility of non-drivers and impairs consumer 
choice for drivers. 
D. Myth Four: Sprawl Cannot Be Limited Without Suffocating 
Government Interference 
Bruegmann’s discussion of the effects of anti-sprawl measures, al-
though sometimes ºawed, is more balanced than the rest of his book. He 
discusses numerous policies designed to limit sprawl, correctly pointing 
out that some attempts to limit sprawl through land use regulation have 
been ineffective152 or have raised land prices by constricting the supply of 
land.153 
It is unclear, however, whether Bruegmann thinks these negative ef-
fects are inevitable. In discussing Oregon’s planning system (which limits 
suburban development around Portland and other Oregon cities by pro-
hibiting large-scale development outside governmentally designated “ur-
ban growth boundaries”),154 Bruegmann goes back and forth between 
condemning the Oregon system and acknowledging that the effects of 
growth boundaries upon housing prices are unclear. At one point, Brueg-
mann writes that the “losers” from the growth boundary include “all of 
the potential future inhabitants of the city [who] will pay sharply higher 
prices for their houses than those who arrived before the growth man-
 
                                                     
urbs); Gillham, supra note 1, at 132 (noting that the majority of America’s poor live 
in central cities). 
148. See 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 457 (calculations made by author based on list of 
expenditures for each individual item). 
149. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text (explaining how automobile ownership 
is almost compulsory in much of America. Cf. supra notes 60–113 and accompanying 
text (showing how government policy has facilitated sprawl). 
150. Of course, public transit has costs—but those costs are far smaller. The total expense 
of public transit in the United States was $30 billion in 2001. See 2006 Abstract, supra 
note 46, at 449. By contrast, Americans spent over $800 billion on auto-related ex-
penses. Id. 
151. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 220. 
152. See id. at 180–91. For example, some municipalities have sought to deter suburban 
development by requiring ªve or ten acres per lot, thus causing suburban densities 
to be even lower than they might otherwise have been. Id. at 190. 
153. See id. at 188–89 (using growth controls in Boulder, Colorado as an example of regu-
lation that, “[b]y reducing the supply of developable land[,] . . . drove up the price of 
land and the cost of new housing.”)  
154. Id. at 205 (describing Oregon planning scheme). 
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agement measures started to have an effect.”155 A few pages earlier, how-
ever, he characterizes studies of the Oregon system’s effects upon prices 
as a “bewildering duel of statistics”156 with “inconclusive”157 results. 
Bruegmann’s relatively balanced treatment of growth controls, never-
theless, conceals an error of omission: regardless of the effects of Oregon’s 
policies, it is certainly possible, in theory, to limit development in outer 
suburbs without reducing the overall amount of buildable land. Suppose, 
for example, that a state implements a system similar to Oregon’s but de-
regulates development inside the boundary. In such a situation, it is at 
least possible that the amount of overall developable land in the region 
might stay the same, thus avoiding massive increases in housing prices.158 
Bruegmann also fails to adequately discuss the possibility of limiting 
sprawl through more market-oriented, libertarian policies. The only such 
policy that Bruegmann discusses in detail is the option of cutting gov-
ernment spending on sprawl-creating expressways—an option Brueg-
mann vigorously rejects. He asserts that inadequate road construction 
“has led to a marked increase in congestion”159 while regions such as 
Phoenix, Atlanta, and Houston are “building [their way] out of conges-
tion.”160 In fact, however, congestion increased in all three areas between 
1982 and 2003: from 17 hours per rush-hour traveler to 67 in Atlanta,161 
from 39 hours to 63 in Houston,162 and from 18 hours to 49 in Phoenix.163 
Bruegmann further asserts that Chicago has not built enough freeways to 
accommodate trafªc,164 but two of the three regions he praises (Atlanta 
and Houston) have more hours of delay per traveler than Chicago!165 
 
                                                     
155. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 216. 
156. Id. at 210. 
157. Id. 
158. See Levine, supra note 104, at 195–96 (suggesting that this may have happened in 
Oregon to some extent). Cf. Garnett, supra note 14, at 10 (admitting that growth con-
trols combined with selective deregulation may reduce housing prices in theory, but 
adding that policymakers “may lack the political will to implement these tools on a 
large enough scale to counter the regressive effects of growth management.”). 
159. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 193 (“[N]ew road construction has lagged dramatically 
behind roadway use, and this has led to a marked increase in congestion.”). Brueg-
mann’s reliance upon “roadway use,” however, (as opposed to population growth) 
as a measure of “adequate” road construction leads to absurd results. For example, 
suppose Sprawl City has no public transit or sidewalks, experiences 5% population 
growth per decade, and increases its road network by 200% per decade. The new 
roads create additional sprawl, causing people to live further from work and other 
amenities which, in turn, causes vehicle miles traveled to increase by 300%. Although 
Sprawl City has embarked on a gigantic road-building program and has refused to 
support alternatives to driving, Bruegmann’s logic would lead one to conclude 
Sprawl City policymakers are “anti-automobile.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 192 
(asserting that “anti-automobile reformers” blocked some urban freeways). 
160. Id. at 253 n.25. 
161. See Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Atlanta, GA, available at http:// 
mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/atlanta.pdf. 
162. See Texas Trans. Inst., The Mobility Data for Houston, TX, available at http:// 
mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/houston.pdf. 
163. See Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Phoenix, AZ, available at http:// 
mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/phoenix.pdf. 
164. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 193.  
165. See Texas Transp. Inst., The Mobility Data for Chicago, IL-IN, available at http:// 
mobility.tamu.edu/ums/congestion_data/tables/chicago.pdf (Chicago has 58 hours 
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In fact, the effects of road-building upon congestion are anything but 
certain. Perversely, road-building may make some places more congested 
because of the phenomenon of “induced trafªc.”166 If a road makes suburb 
X more popular to commuters and employers,167 that suburb will attract 
more development, which means roads going to and from suburb X will 
inevitably be more crowded.168 
Moreover, Bruegmann’s focus on regulation and transportation over-
looks the possibility that sprawl can be limited by reducing, rather than 
by increasing, land use regulation—in particular, by thinning out the web 
of zoning, parking and street design regulations that make American sub-
urbs so automobile-dependent. A libertarian, anti-sprawl legal reform pack-
age would: 
* Allow landowners to mix commercial and residential uses more 
frequently so that more Americans could live within walking dis-
tance of shops and jobs.169 
* Allow the market, rather than zoning laws, to govern popula-
tion density.170 If landowners could build compact neighborhoods 
without government interference, more people could live within 
walking distance of commercial areas or transit stops.171 
 
                                                     
of delay per traveler); see also supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text (Atlanta 
has 67 hours of delay per traveler; Houston has 63). 
166. Public debate over this proposition has led to “a bewildering duel of statistics [with] 
inconclusive [results].” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 210 (using these phrases to de-
scribe debate over effects of Oregon planning policies upon housing prices). See Sur-
face Transp. Pol’y Project, Road Building Has Little Effect on Congestion, 
available at http://transact.org/report.asp?id=88 (suggesting that regions that most 
rapidly expanded road network experienced increased congestion to same extent as 
regions that had built fewer roads). But see contra Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 284 
n.29 (citing studies to contrary). 
167. Indeed, roads often make a given suburb more popular. See supra note 63. 
168. Bruegmann asserts that “induced trafªc” is comprised of people “switching from 
one route or means of transportation to a faster and more direct one” and thus does 
not increase overall travel. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 131. This may be true where 
the highway does not affect where people live—for example, a road between two al-
ready-developed areas that merely duplicates an existing road. Not all roads, how-
ever, necessarily meet these narrow criteria. Cf. Neal Peirce, Highway Builders Rev Up 
For New Wave of Beltways, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Oct. 9, 1995, at B7, available 
at 1995 WNLR 1001416 (suggesting that a new road near Chicago “will open up large 
new areas of inexpensive farmland for development”). 
169. See Garnett, supra note 33, at 21 (stating that existing zoning creates “spatial separa-
tion of land uses”); at 32 (zoning laws could be amended to allow mixed-use neighbor-
hoods “where homes are situated within walking distance of stores, restaurants and 
parks.”). 
170. See Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 St. Louis U. Pub. 
L. Rev. 253, 253 (2002) (“[H]allmarks of American land use law [include] reducing 
population density and dispersing residents over wider areas”). 
171. See Robert H. Freilich, The Land Use Implications of Transit-Oriented Development: Con-
trolling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and Urban Sprawl, 30 Urb. Law. 
547, 552 n.18 (1998) (explaining that, in low-density areas, transit use is rare because 
“commuters are required to travel too far to transit stations”); see also Duany & Talen, 
supra note 98, at 1448 (explaining that in a pedestrian-oriented neighborhood, resi-
dences should be within ¼ mile of other destinations); Ewing, supra note 90, at 2–3 
(discussing positive effects of higher density in more detail). 
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* Abolish setback and minimum parking requirements that re-
quire owners of apartment buildings, ofªces and stores to place 
buildings far from streets and to surround those buildings with 
parking lots.172 If landowners had the right to substitute houses 
and shops for parking lots and to bring buildings closer to streets, 
they could create more compact, pedestrian-friendly places by 
placing more buildings on a parcel. In turn, this would make pe-
destrian commutes shorter and more pleasant by eliminating the 
seas of parking that separate shops, ofªces and other destinations 
from each other.173 
* Amend municipal subdivision regulations that require the con-
struction of wide streets.174 Wide streets take more time for pedes-
trians to cross and thus discourage walking both by lengthening a 
pedestrian’s commute and by increasing the amount of time the 
pedestrian is exposed to trafªc.175 
* Allow more on-street parking.176 On-street parking creates a buffer 
between pedestrians and fast-moving cars, thus making walking 
more appealing.177 
Unlike growth controls, some of these reforms might actually expand 
housing supply; land that is currently used for parking or streets could be 
used for additional housing. Unlike regulation-oriented policies, more-
over, these reforms would actually expand consumer choice by reducing 
government regulation of land use. Thus, it is possible to increase the 
number of compact, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods without making 
government more intrusive or increasing housing prices. It follows that, 
because Bruegmann gives short shift to such deregulatory anti-sprawl 
reforms,178 his analysis of remedies for sprawl is incomplete. 
 
                                                     
172. See Donald C. Shoup, The High Cost of Free Parking 22, 25 (2005) (providing that 
off-street parking requirements are so common as to be one of “three basic sets of 
regulations” that are virtually universal). See also Duany & Talen, supra note 98, at 
1449 (ªnding setback requirements also common); James Howard Kunstler, Home 
From Nowhere 138 (1996) (showing that setback laws generally “keep buildings far 
away from the street in order to create parking lots all around the building.”). 
173. See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of 
Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 Va. Envtl. L.J. 247, 261 n.49 (2000) (stat-
ing that minimum parking requirements reduce density by “lead[ing] to the con-
sumption of enormous amounts of land” for parking); Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart 
Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get There From Here?, 29 Fordham Urb. 
L.J. 1529, 1534 (2002) (stating that minimum parking requirements make stores and 
ofªce buildings less accessible to pedestrians and bicyclists by creating “huge ex-
panses of asphalt” between those buildings in the form of parking lots, thus increas-
ing distance between buildings and lengthening commutes). 
174. See Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will The Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth 
Century Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 101, 111 (2000) (“[M]unicipal 
subdivision regulations commonly require overly wide streets”). 
175. See Donovan v. Jones, 658 So. 2d 755, 765 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (“[A] wider roadway 
takes longer to cross thus increasing the time the pedestrian is exposed to trafªc”); 
see also Freilich, supra note 171, at 557. 
176. Cf. Lewyn, supra note 30, at 334 (noting that cities often limit on-street parking). 
177. See Jeremy Meredith, Sprawl And The New Urbanist Solution, 89 Va. L. Rev. 447, 481 
(2003). 
178. With the exception of his assertion early in his book that, because some places have 
become more dense, zoning may have “changed as necessary to accommodate mar-
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E. Myth Five: Only Elitists Oppose Sprawl 
Bruegmann repeatedly asserts that sprawl is what ordinary middle-
class people want while “elites” dare to question this trend. For example, 
he claims that, in the 1920s, the creation of suburbs in Britain “led to a 
violent reaction among members of Britain’s literary and artistic elite.”179 
He asserts that, in recent decades, “upper-middle-class residents of cen-
tral cities”180 engaged in an “assault on urban freeways”181 only when “the 
automobile ceased to be a luxury item for the afºuent and came into the 
hands of a large middle class.”182 Bruegmann similarly writes that, today, 
“the anti-sprawl movement has been heavily supported by individuals 
drawn from an upper-middle class professional population . . . an elite 
group of academics, central-city business leaders, and employees of not-
for-proªt organizations.”183 This “elite” believes that “[s]prawl is where 
other people live, particularly people with less taste and good sense than 
themselves. Much anti-sprawl activism is based on a desire to reform these 
other people’s lives.”184 Bruegmann further suggests that New Urbanism 
(a movement of architects who seek to design more mixed-use neighbor-
hoods) is “only the latest version of a long-standing desire by cultural el-
ites to manage middle-class urban life.”185 
All of these remarks are basically “ad hominem” attacks—that is, they 
target people making anti-sprawl arguments rather than the arguments 
themselves.186 This sort of argument is logically fallacious, however, be-
cause even “elites” are sometimes right. 
Moreover, it is simply not the case that only “elites” are concerned 
about sprawl. This theory is implicitly rebutted by Bruegmann’s own 
statement that “[w]hen asked, most Americans familiar with the term de-
clare themselves against sprawl just as they say they are against pollution 
or the destruction of historic buildings.”187 If “most Americans” are in 
some sense against sprawl, opponents of sprawl are hardly an “elite.” 
 
                                                     
ket realities.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 106. This statement, as noted above, over-
looks the possibility that not every attempt to rezone property is successful. See supra 
notes 104–113 and accompanying text. 
179. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 117. 
180. Id. at 130. 
181. Id. His discussion of people who were actually “assaulted” by freeways is far more 
clinical. He admits that freeways “displaced vast numbers of families.” Id. However, 
he treats these displacements as mere “bad side effects” of policies that “clearly did 
help enormously with urban congestion.” Id. See also supra notes 64–72 and accom-
panying text (discussing freeway-related displacement in more detail). 
182. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 130. 
183. Id. at 163. 
184. Id. at 161. 
185. Id. at 259 n.40 (asserting that another author “persuasively argues” as much). 
186. See supra note 117 (describing fallacy). 
187. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 161. See also Jennifer Frericks, A Regional Government For 
Fragmented St. Louis: Even The “Favored Quarter” Would Beneªt, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 361, 
362 n.9 (2005) (citing poll data; for example, one survey found that 78% of Americans 
favored policies to curb sprawl); Anonymous, Community Designs Deter Physical Ac-
tivity, Nation’s Health, June 1, 2003, at 18, available at 2003 WLNR 6757240 (show-
ing most American adults favor a variety of policies designed to make streets more 
walkable; for example, 70% favored increasing federal spending on pedestrian facili-
ties, 55% would rather walk more than drive more, and almost half favored design-
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Bruegmann also writes that “stopping or slowing the growth of new 
development and sprawl often provides great material advantage to ex-
isting residents”188 by reducing the number of new cars on the roads that 
suburbanites use and increasing home values by limiting the supply of 
developable land.189 Since most Americans drive cars190 (and thus may 
want less trafªc) and own homes191 (and thus may want increasing hous-
ing prices), it logically follows that most Americans have selªsh reasons 
to oppose new suburban development. Americans who do not own cars, 
moreover, have even stronger motives to oppose sprawl: where jobs move 
to automobile-dependent suburbs, carless Americans are frozen out of 
those jobs.192 Therefore, if both Americans with and without cars have rea-
son to be concerned about sprawl, nearly all Americans are part of 
Bruegmann’s so-called “anti-sprawl elite.” 
Indeed, Bruegmann’s populist rhetoric could just as easily be turned 
against sprawl because the United States has a powerful pro-sprawl “elite”: 
the road-building lobby.193 A wide variety of corporate interests, including 
automobile manufacturers, tire manufacturers, cement manufacturers, car 
dealers, truckers,194 general contractors, and homebuilders,195 lobby Con-
gress to spend more money on highways196 (although federal spending on 
highways already exceeds transit spending by about a 5-1 margin).197 This 
 
                                                     
ing communities so that houses and shops were closer together, even if houses 
would be closer together). 
188. Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 162. 
189. Id. 
 190. See 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 637 (showing that only 9 million of nation’s 105.8 
million occupied housing units had no car). 
191. See Alphonso R. Jackson, Rising Housing Costs Are A National Concern, 12 Fall J. Af-
fordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 1 (2002) (stating that about 68% of Americans own 
homes). 
192. See Mann, supra note 4, at 607 (noting that most suburban jobs are not accessible 
through public transit). Indeed, it could be argued that because carless Americans are 
disproportionately poor, Bruegmann’s support of automobile-oriented development 
could itself be described as “elitist.” See Garnett, supra note 140, at 183 & n.61 (show-
ing that most welfare recipients do not own cars). 
193. As well as the less powerful aesthetic elite that Bruegmann cites in favor of his 
views. He devotes two pages of his book in a section headed “The Avant-Garde Dis-
covers Sprawl” to a listing of the avant-garde architects who, in his words, seek “to 
describe and understand the aesthetics of sprawl.” Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 153–
54. 
194. See American Highway Users Alliance, The Open Road 9, available at 
http://www.highways.org/pdfs/2006action-plan.pdf (visited June 13, 2006) (show-
ing that all of these industries represented on board of American Highway Users Al-
liance, a group that lobbies for increased road funding). 
195. See U.S. Pirg, Driven By Dollars 6, available at http://www.uspirg.org/reports/ 
DrivenbyDollars.pdf (noting that general contractors and homebuilders also part of 
road lobby). 
196. Id. at 10–11. 
197. 2006 Abstract, supra note 46, at 709 (showing that in 2003, federal budget included 
just over $97 billion in outlays for highway trust fund and just under $20 billion for 
Federal Transit Administration grants). Bruegmann argues that this gap is hardly in-
equitable because highway ridership is much higher than transit ridership. See Brueg-
mann, supra note 1, at 146. Building highways based on low transit ridership creates 
a self-fulªlling prophecy: if government provides lots of highways and scarce transit 
service, of course more people will use the highways. See Transp. Data, supra note 
129 (“Only 4 percent of the nation’s 4 million miles of roads are now served by tran-
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elite gives vast amounts of money to politicians. For example, general 
contractors gave over $10 million to 81 Senators and 401 Congresspeople 
in 2004,198 car dealers gave $4.6 million,199 and automobile manufacturers 
gave $1.5 million.200 Bruegmann, however, does not describe automobile 
manufacturers or general contractors as “elites,” even though these cor-
porations may well have more money and power than the academics, 
downtown businesses, and not-for-proªt employees who Bruegmann de-
scribes as “elites.”201 
If Bruegmann is trying to argue that only elites oppose sprawl, he is 
wrong because most Americans favor some limits on suburban sprawl. If 
Bruegmann is trying to argue that all elites oppose sprawl, he is equally 
wrong because the United States has pro-sprawl elites aplenty. Either 
way, Bruegmann’s populist posing adds more heat than light to the de-
bate over suburban development. 
III. Conclusion 
Bruegmann’s book is less important in and of itself than it is as an ex-
ample of some common misconceptions about sprawl: the notion that the 
status quo is inevitable, the denial of government complicity, and the de-
nial of sprawl’s more unpleasant consequences. 
Bruegmann claims that sprawl exists in every afºuent society—but 
there is a world of difference between a region like New York City, where 
an automobile-centered life is one lifestyle choice among many, and a city 
like Oklahoma City, in which almost every adult needs a car to live a 
normal life. Bruegmann claims that sprawl is a result of the free market at 
work—but, in fact, government-built highways fragment development 
across the landscape, and government-enforced zoning, parking and 
street design regulations impede the creation of alternatives to sprawl. 
Bruegmann claims that sprawl expands consumer choice—but, in its most 
extreme forms, sprawl actually limits consumer choices by making the 
automobile the only feasible mode of transportation in many places. 
 
 
                                                     
sit.”). By contrast, if government shifted resources to transit, transit ridership might 
continue to rise. Cf. supra note 46 and accompanying text (showing that transit rider-
ship rose in recent years). 
198. Ctr. for Responsive Pols., General Contractors: Money to Congress, available 
at http://opensecrets.org/industries/summary.asp?Ind=C01&cycle=2004. 
199. Ctr. For Responsive Pols., Car Dealers: Money to Congress, available at http:// 
opensecrets.org/industries/summary.asp?Ind=T2300&recipdetail=A&sortorder=U& 
Cycle =2004. 
200. Ctr. For Responsive Pols., Auto Manufacturers: Money to Congress, available at 
http://opensecrets.org/industries/summary.asp?cycle=2004&ind=T2100. 
201. See Bruegmann, supra note 1, at 163 (describing these groups as components of anti-
sprawl “elite.”). 
